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ABSTRACT 
The cultural face of modern China is constantly changing, whether through economic 
reforms, political campaigns, or social values. The ultimate inheritors and current carriers 
of this society in flux is the current post socialist, post 1989 youth generation. This paper 
examines the cultural changes that are occurring in China through six documentary films 
made in the 21st century that focus on youth and young adults as the representatives of 
the issues that the directors explore. In two films, the issue of the Single Child Policy will 
be examined in terms of the social repercussions the policy has created for modern youth, 
including gender, ethnic, and class inequalities. In the next two films, the economic 
conditions that have produced millions of migrant examined as it relates to the changing 
family values in much of China. The last two films explore the consumer culture of 
today’s modern youth, and how this culture impacts the expressive output of this 
generation. I conclude through these films that although the youth of today have been 
irrevocably shaped by these, and other, cultural changes that have occurred during their 
lifetime, they are still most fundamentally influenced by the traditional values of Chinese 
culture including relationships, family, and collective expression.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Overview 
 
 China, the most populous country on earth, is poised on the edge of becoming the 
most important global superpower in the 21st century. Its economic growth and social 
reforms of the past 40 years have been astounding not only in their scope but in their 
impact on the landscape of China today. The next generation of leadership in China will 
have a large hand in deciding its fate, whether it will remain stagnant in the status quo, 
undergo transformative reforms, or fall behind economically and politically. Those 
leaders, who will be called to set the course for China in this century, are now coming of 
age. These youths and young adults have lived their formative years in a China that was 
unlike any previously seen. A China that while still nominally Communist, enjoyed a 
flourishing market economy and unprecedented domestic consumption. A China that was 
hurtling towards a post-industrial era, while still demanding a massive labor force to 
work under unsafe and unfair conditions. A China that was becoming increasingly 
politically free, was still functioning under totalitarian social institutions. China’s 
schizophrenic behavior of the past several decades will come to an end and soon, and the 
generation to light the path has had these inconsistencies as a part of their relationship 
with China since birth. How this generation views and relates to their world, the reasons 
behind their attitudes, and how this will play out into the future is the subject being 
examined in this thesis.  
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 These questions will be answered through the examination of six documentary films 
made about this millennial generation. All of these documentaries have been made since 
the turn of the century and feature youths and young adults ages eight to twenty two as 
their main subjects. These films are each tackling a different aspect of life in China today, 
from environmental degradation, to migrant workers, to a pop culture television program, 
and feature children and young adults directly affected by these outside forces. However, 
this thesis will seek the social currents running through these documentaries, the deeper 
effects these social issues have had on the youth of today. For example, a film that is 
nominally addressing the Three Gorges Dam project might also be addressing the Single 
Child Policy and the ethnic and class distinctions that this policy makes, another film 
might be examining a girl’s singing competition, while really showing the effect of 
consumerism on the youth of today. The multilayered narrative in each of these films is 
the primary source for first hand material from the youths themselves.  
 In studying these films, this thesis hopes to show that the social and economic 
programs undertaken by the government since the reform and opening period of the late 
1970s have had a profound and lasting effect on the lives of Chinese today in myriad 
ways. Ultimately, however, it is the traditional Chinese values that have been in place for 
thousands of years that continue to chiefly inform and create the worldview of the 
Chinese youths today. Despite the influence of Communism and Westernization, China’s 
youth is still deeply imbued with the traditional values that have made up the Chinese 
worldview for centuries, including relationships, hierarchical family values, longevity, 
and destiny. As China continues to enter the world stage, it would do best to draw on this 
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tradition for wisdom and guidance and not look to the West or to Communist ideology 
for the lead. China’s problems are uniquely Chinese, China’s solutions should be also.  
 
Why Documentary?  
 Noted British documentarian John Grierson once said that non-fiction film is “The 
creative treatment of actuality”. In this quotation he encapsulates the essential duality of 
the genre. On one hand, the main distinguishing feature of the genre is that is films 
reality, not what has been created on a Hollywood sound stage. At the same time, 
however, the non-fiction film is also the creative work of an author who has a point of 
view and, presumably, an agenda. The very act of choosing to film one particular 
situation over another is making a creative choice; the hand of the filmmaker has shaped 
reality even before editing, sound, and cinematography take place. In order to effectively 
talk about documentaries, one needs to be familiar with not only the terms used for film 
criticism but also the terms that make documentaries unique. 
 Documentary film is as old as narrative film but has charted a different course from 
it since the beginning. In the early stages of film prior to the first narrative feature, most 
of the films captured were actuality films, such as the shorts depicting a train station 
captured by Louis and Auguste Lumiere.1 The term documentary wasn’t coined until 
1926, and was used to describe the new feature by Robert Flaherty, Nanook of the North, 
which is considered by most to be the first true documentary film.2 Throughout much of 
                                                
1 Barnouw, Erik. Documentary: History of the Non-Fiction Film. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1983.  
2 Ibid.  
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the rest of the 19th century, the documentary films followed in this romantic, narrative 
style. There was some experimentation with city symphony films and Cinéma-vérité style 
documentaries, but for the most part the documentary releases have followed a similar arc 
to their narrative counterparts.3 However, unlike the narrative films, documentaries, 
particularly those made in recent decades, depict true to life scenarios and capture reality 
in a way that narrative film is neither interested in nor capable of.  
 Documentary film has been chosen for this thesis because of its ability to both 
capture the words of the subjects as well as place them in a physical space, and allow the 
audience to draw their own conclusions based on the interplay between these two modes 
of information. Often, the image will be more important than the actual words when it 
comes to reading the true meaning or feeling behind them. When a subject of a book or 
statistic is asked a question, you are bound by their word to believe that they are speaking 
truly and accurately expressing their feelings. However, in documentary films, the 
audience can compare and contrast what is said with the images that are presented for the 
viewer. What the subject says might be held out by the images, or it may not be, the 
further information allows the viewer to analyze the information presented on two levels.  
 Documentary also offers an access to personal information and contact that would 
be unimaginable for the majority of the audience. The documentaries examined in this 
thesis all bring the viewer in closer to a world that they would likely not be able to even 
see without the help of the film. We, as viewers, are privy to the real emotional lives of 
others and through this connection we are able to bridge the gap in understanding. In a 
                                                
3 Guynn, William. A Cinema of Nonfiction. Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses,  Inc. 1990.  
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world that is constantly changing, especially one changing as rapidly as China, it is 
important to document and share the reality that is disappearing right in front of our eyes. 
In many Chinese cities, neighbors are there one day and gone the next, an area of the city 
is suddenly destroyed and a piece of history is just cut out and cut off from your mind. 
However, with documentary film, the places and history are forever chronicled in not 
only the community’s memory but in film.  
 
Chinese Documentary Film 
China is a factory of stories, and there has been a rush in recent years to mine 
them for the viewing public in a boom of documentary features. There have been a wave 
of Chinese documentarians – among them Wang Bing, Zhao Liang and Huang Weikai – 
who are creating some of the most epic and important films being made anywhere in the 
world.4 Their documentaries have revealed some of the major social ills plaguing China 
today, whether the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake or the labor abuses of oil workers 
in the Gobi desert, they tell the untold story of China’s development.  
However, these films are almost entirely made underground, meaning without the 
consent of the Chinese government, and therefore illegally. In order to get a film made as 
well as to release a final film for the Chinese theaters, a director needs to seek approval 
from the Chinese government.5 So if you’re making a film the government might find 
unpleasant or disagreeable, you won’t get that approval and therefore you will not be able 
                                                
4 Berry, Chris, Rofel, Lisa, and Xinyu, Lu. The New Chinese Documentary Film  Movement: For the Public 
Record. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press,  2010 
5 Pickowicz, Paul G. and Zhang, Yingjin. From Underground to Independent: Alternative Film Culture in 
Contemporary China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006.  
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to legally shoot or release your film within China. However, the government’s attention 
is mainly focused on the more easily regulated narrative film industry and, for the most 
part, does not target documentary filmmakers. In addition to the government’s lack of 
interest, since the introduction of digital film recording in the past view years, it is 
possible for a director to shoot an entire film alone, with no more equipment then a small 
video camera, so their access is almost unlimited. Independent filmmaking is 
underground and there’s a whole system of production and distribution that is under the 
radar of the government.6  
Unfortunately, these films often go under the radar of the larger viewing public as 
well. Though these films often win plaudits and prizes in international film festivals, it’s 
hard for them to be seen by Chinese audiences. All the broadcasters are owned by the 
state in China and they only broadcast in-house documentaries, which are mainly 
propaganda or nature documentaries. There’s no governmental or art funding in China so 
most of the documentarians have to look for investors outside of the country and screen 
almost exclusively to a Western film festival audience. However, the audience base is 
slowly getting bigger in China: white-collar workers, intellectuals, and young students in 
city centers like Beijing or Shanghai can join a documentary group or a small film society 
that will sometimes put on a low-key unofficial screening in saloons or bookstores. 
Although it is important to get any and all domestic viewership for the films, the majority 
of the people, especially those who most desperately need an outside source of 
information, will remain in the dark about the very existence of the alternative narrative 
                                                
6 Ibid.  
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presented in these films.    
 
A Look Ahead 
 This thesis consists of three main chapters, each dealing with one major social issue 
and discussing two films to help understand this issue. In the second chapter, the Single 
Child Policy’s history and modern ramifications are examined through the lens of two 
films: Up The Yangtze, which chronicles the story of two teenagers who have been 
affected by the Three Gorges Dam project, and Please Vote For Me, which shows a 
democratic election of class monitor in a third grade classroom. The next chapter focuses 
on the political and economic policies that led to the current migrant worker epidemic, as 
seen in Railroad of Hope and Last Train Home, both of which tell the story of migrant 
workers travelling to and from their work. The last chapter examines the consumer 
culture that has erupted among Chinese youth today as well as the global influence that 
has spawned many of the current consumer trends; this is exhibited in Super, Girls!, 
about the 2006 female singing competition, and Follow Your Heart, about the 
underground hip-hop culture of Shanghai
 15 
Chapter Two 
 
Single Child Policy: Regional Disparities, Gender Bias, and the Little 
Emperor Syndrome  
 
 
Introduction 
In attempt to curb its rapidly expanding population, the CCP has enforced the One 
Child Policy for over four decades. The policy is so pervasive, particularly in urban 
regions, that siblings are quickly becoming an oddity rather than a given. Those born post 
2000 are not only without their own siblings but also their parents are often only children, 
therefore many of the youths of today have no cousins, uncles, or aunts. The typical 
Chinese family tree has become increasingly sparser as the single child policy enters its 
fifth decade and the family unit has been whittled down to just grandparents, parents, and 
child.  
The CCP leaders argue that this drastic method of population control was a 
necessary measure, and, indeed, it has drastically slowed down the previously 
exponential population growth. However, it has also resulted in myriad social 
ramifications. Three of the most prominent issues created by this policy, as well as those 
most challenging to solve, are the enhanced distinction between urban and rural or 
minority children created by the policy, the gender imbalance created by the Chinese 
preference for sons, and the behavioral problems known commonly as “little emperor 
syndrome” which occurs when a single child is the sole object of attention for his or her 
parents and grandparents.  
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In this chapter, two films that deal with five children of the post-1989 generation 
will be examined under the lens of the single child policy and these three social issues 
created by this government policy. Neither of the films, Please Vote For Me and Up The 
Yangtze, addresses the single child policy directly but the undercurrent is running 
throughout and dictates the lives and attitudes of the five main characters. Indeed, these 
films were selected because the ramifications of the single child policy on society are 
most clear when they’re not explicitly stated. To ask a little emperor what he thinks about 
the phenomenon is not nearly as illuminating as watching a little emperor in his first job 
or participate in student elections.  
The filmmakers have a different agenda in both of these films: one is to chronicle 
the multilevel impact of a major public works project, the second is to perform a 
democracy experiment on a group of young students, but through their edits it is clear 
that both directors are drawn to the behavioral and societal problems that are shaping the 
lives of their subjects, almost all of which can be traced back to impacts of the one child 
policy. How the single child policy and these effects have impacted the worldview of the 
youths portrayed is another key issue, and in many cases the single child policy has 
served to enhance many of the social inequalities that have pervaded China for millennia. 
Before addressing the films, however, the history of the single child policy must 
be more closely examined to fully comprehend the reasons it was created and the social 
atmosphere it has instilled in modern China. 
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History of the Single Child Policy 
China is the most populous nation in the world; with over 1.3 billion people, it 
towers over other global super powers such as the United States, which has a population 
of only a little more than 300 million. The Chinese government presides over one out of 
every five people on the planet. That amount of power and responsibility dictates what 
issues the government, and behind it the CCP, will give precedence in their agenda and 
which will remain a secondary priority. Over its 60 years of existence, the government 
has shown that it is more concerned with providing the basic human necessities of food, 
housing, and medical care before addressing other concerns, such as human rights and 
social unrest. To ensure that the country would be able to provide a basic living standard 
for it’s billions of citizens into the future, the government implemented a family planning 
policy in 1979. The enforcement of this policy has waxed and waned, and has generally 
been focused on specific urban areas rather than the entire country, which is, in large part, 
rural farmland.  
The one child policy has had very few, and mostly minor alterations, since its 
initial inception over forty years ago: each married couple of child-bearing age is limited 
to only one child, and the state closely monitors and controls who can conceive in a given 
year.1 In contrast, the countryside, where about 53% of China’s population lives, contains 
three variants of the one-child policy. In the coastal provinces about 40% of couples are 
                                                
1 White, Tyrene. China’s Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People’s Republic 1949-2005. London: 
Cornell University Press, 2006. 2 
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permitted a second child if their first child was female. In central and southern provinces 
everyone is permitted a second child either if the first is a girl or if the parents suffer 
“hardship”, a criterion determined by local officials. In the far west and Inner Mongolia, 
the provinces do not operate a one-child policy at all.2 Another exception to this policy is 
the exclusion of any minority groups from any birth planning campaign, particularly 
those in volatile regions, such as Tibet or Xinjiang.3  
The history of birth planning in China since the People’s Republic’s was founded 
in 1949 has been marked by many fluctuations in policy. In the volatile political years 
between 1949 and 1979, in short the years under Chairman Mao Zedong, the government 
alternately encouraged and discouraged larger families. 4 These fluctuations in the 
government’s attitude towards birth planning during Mao’s time in power accounted for 
the drastic fluctuations in the population between the period that the People’s Republic 
was formed and the end of Mao’s life. However, despite the industrialization, violence, 
famines, and campaigns of various successes, population predictions demonstrated that 
China’s population would continue to grow exponentially if each woman was allowed to 
have two children.5 The CCP could see that the only long lasting solution would involve 
drastic measures. Mao’s death in 1976 opened the possibility for his successor to move 
                                                
2 Xue, Xinran. “The Worldwide War on Baby Girls.” The Economist, May 4, 2010.  
3 Saith,Ashwani. “Economic Incentives for the One child Family in Rural China.” The China Quarterly, No. 
87 (Sep. 1981) 496.  
4 Fitzpatrick 
5 Aird, John S. Slaughter of the Innocents: Coercive Birth Control in China. Washington  
 D.C.: The AEI Press. 1990. 28 
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away from the Chairman’s extreme Marxist/Leninist view of population, which focused 
on the manpower of population rather than the practical matter of being able to provide 
for the citizens that make up the powerful nation.  
The period surrounding Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power marked a time of radical 
political and economic reforms that would shape the way the government as well as the 
people would understand birth planning.6 The one-child policy was first proposed in 1978 
and was officially adopted in September 1980 when Deng was poised to claim power. 
Deng openly supported the policy saying that birth planning, and specifically the one 
child policy, was of “major importance for the national economy.” 7 The policy had 
almost universal support because of the positive economic slant that Deng had applied to 
the importance of population control and after years of chaos surrounding mostly 
unchecked population growth, a government showing concern for the issue was 
drastically preferred.  
Today, the goals of reducing population growth have been met and the one child 
policy proved to be the only overwhelmingly successful method of slowing population 
growth.  In 1949 the fertility rate was 6.14 children per family, by 1979 it had fallen to 
2.75 but by 2003, after 20 years of the one child policy, the rate had dropped to as low as 
1.4 children per household.8  In part, because of this slow down of the population, the 
nation has risen beyond all expectations in world standing, both politically and 
                                                
6 White, 61 
7 Scharping, 54 
8 White, 43- 45 
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economically. However, the social repercussions of the policy, less quantifiable but none 
the less tangible, are becoming an increasing burden upon the Chinese people and 
government, three of which will now be explicated through the following two films.  
 
 
Contrasting Characters in Up The Yangzte  
Up The Yangzte was a 2007 film directed by Yung Chung and chronicles the final 
stages of the completion of the Three Gorges Dam Project, a massive hydro-electrical 
undertaking that would flood a large section of the Yangtze River and surrounding land. 
Although such a literally massive topic could have been framed cinematically in any 
number of ways, Chung decided to illustrate this moment in Chinese history as seen 
through the experiences of two teenagers living in Hubei province.  
After it’s initial universal application, the one-child policy was scaled back to take 
into account the vastly dissimilar amounts of population growth in different areas of the 
country and outside of the Han majority ethnic group. As the population began to move 
in droves to the coastal cities and provinces, the population control efforts there became 
stricter while those in the relatively sparsely populated countryside could become laxer. 
Often, the areas that became less densely populated were also areas that were largely 
inhabited by non-Han ethnic groups, particularly the far western provinces such as Tibet 
or Xinjiang. In these two cases, the one-child policy has been all but discarded in order to 
preserve the 55 other ethnic minorities as well as to ensure a semblance of balance 
between coastal cities and interior provinces, demographically. In the film, Up the 
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Yangzte, one of each type of child is portrayed: a girl from a rural area with ethnic 
minority status and a Han boy from a smaller urban setting on the Yangzte River.  
Shui Yu is the 16-year-old daughter of farmers who have been displaced from 
their home by the rising tides and have been temporarily living in a shack on the banks of 
the river, which will inevitably be washed away as well. Bo Yu ‘Jerry’ Chen is a 19 year 
old high school graduate who is the only son of a middle class family. These two cross 
paths when they both join the crew of one of the Yangtze river cruises that cater to 
Western tourists, Shui Yu in order to support her family and finance her brother’s future 
education, Jerry Chen in order to earn more spending money to finance his nighttime 
exploits with friends. The film closely follows their struggles on shipboard, as well as 
Shui Yu’s parents’ preparations for the flood. Although Chung’s stated purpose in the 
documentary is the chronicle the demise of his ancestral home, the banks of the Yangzte 
River, the storyline as it follows the two teenagers is drawn more and more into their 
struggles with the burdens of expectations placed on them by their parents, one as 
financial supporter and the other as object of affection.  
Shui Yu is not a single child: as part of a minority group as well as a resident of a 
rural part of the province, her parents were able to have another child after giving birth to 
a daughter. Oftentimes, local governments will encourage rural farmers to try for a son if 
their first child is female, to ensure that the agricultural sector continues production.9 
However, the Shui family, who are given this special status, are ironically in no position 
to care for two children, while many who are denied more than one child in the cities 
                                                
9 Economy, Elizabeth C. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 126.  
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would be in a better position, financially, to provide for two children. Although it is clear 
that Shui Yu’s parents love and have cared for her as best they can, the rising river and 
diminishing crop land have forced them to concede to the traditional notion that a child, 
particularly a female, is a burden until they are able to support their parents.  When we 
enter the Shui family’s story, it is at the moment when the oldest child will begin to pay 
back her parents for the sacrifices they have made in order to raise her.  
Shui Yu is asked by her parents to give up her education in order to earn extra 
money for the family. Their explanation for this sacrifice is that as rural farmers, her 
parents lack the skills necessary to support the family on their own. Mother Shui says: “I 
know it’s because your father and I don’t have the skills that we have to exploit you. If 
we had a choice, how could we do this to you?” Although Shui Yu has been shown to 
excel at school, making it all the way to the high school level, she is expected by her 
parents to stop her studies not only to support them but more importantly to support her 
brother, who will continue on in his studies. If Shui Yu had been an only child, the 
changes in the situation are difficult to predict. Perhaps her parents would still force her 
to leave school to work because of their dire situation brought about by the rising river. 
Or, because they’re resources wouldn’t have been stretched between two children, she 
might have been able to continue school and perhaps continue her education to the next 
level, although her parents ability to afford a university education is doubtful. The 
possible outcomes of Shui Yu’s life as a single child are unknown, but the cause of her 
dilemma are: because of their economic situation her family is unable to support two 
children, but because of their rural status, they were prompted to by an economically 
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interested government: one of the many double binds that characterize much of the 
CCP’s social policies.  
 Shui Yu accepts her parents’ demands and her job on the cruise ship is entirely 
for the sake of her family: we see her dutifully sending her earnings home, expressing 
concern for the well being of her parents, and hopes that her money can help them.  One 
child in this family was put upon to become socially and economically superior to her 
parents; to leave the house in order to raise the level of the rest of their family, 
particularly her brother who will likely now become the sole focus of his parents’ 
attention and hopes for an educated child. Shui Yu has become a second child in a world 
that only has room for only children, and this separates her physically from her family 
and from her parents’ expectations. This is beautifully illustrated in the film in the scene 
when her parents depart from visiting her and are taken down in a funicular while Shui 
Yu stands on the platform above them, creating a visual for the separation occurring 
between them, both physically and socially.  
Shui Yu’s parents are adamant that she leave school and begin earning money so 
that she can support her younger brother in achieving a higher level of education than she 
could attain, the implication being that if one child is to receive education, it is naturally 
to be the boy. When this news is imparted to Shui Yu, her reaction is one of her only 
outburst of the entire film: upturning her food bowl and storming off. The injustice of the 
inequality that is befalling her is felt in her act of defiance but moments later the camera 
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shows her anger transforming into a bitter acceptance. This partiality shown to their son 
could be due to the Chinese cultural preference given to sons.  
Marriage, family, and male offspring are all deeply rooted cultural concepts in the 
Chinese society’s psyche and in order to successfully control the amount of births in 
Chinese families, the government had to actively fight against and suppress thousand 
year old traditions. The one child policy is the most dangerous form of population 
control, in the regard to gender demographics and equality, because when limiting a 
Chinese family to one child, the overwhelming majority of parents will try to ensure that 
their child is male. This is because in traditional Chinese society, a female child was seen 
as little more than a burden to her family and a son was preferred. This traditional 
thinking is best described in the ancient "Book of Songs" (1000-700 B.C.): 
When a son is born,  
Let him sleep on the bed,  
Clothe him with fine clothes,  
And give him jade to play... 
When a daughter is born,  
Let her sleep on the ground,  
Wrap her in common wrappings,  
And give broken tiles to play...10 
 
While growing up, a daughter was unable to be as useful as her brothers because of the 
systems of the home environment, where all interactions are based on Confucian 
                                                
10 Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 161.  
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hierarchical relationships.11 Sons could help their fathers tend the fields, while daughters 
could only assist their mothers in household tasks.12 Once the daughter became of age, 
she would marry and leave to live with her husband in his family home.13 The duty to 
care for the parents and grandparents in their old age fell to the sons, who would remain 
in his family home after marriage. Given these circumstances, it becomes clearer why the 
preference for sons has remained so firmly rooted in the Chinese culture.14 The one child 
policy was implemented in 1978 however, not 1878. Many of the distinctions between 
sons and daughters have been made obsolete by modern society. The preference for sons 
remained because of cultural stereotypes that have proved difficult to overcome.   
 The stark contrast to Shui Yu is Bo Yu “Jerry” Chen, the only child of a Han family 
from the nearby urban center. As both a man and an urban citizen, he has been entitled to 
many more opportunities than Shui Yu. The reasons for Jerry to take up a job have 
nothing to do with family sacrifice or his parents’ hopes for a brighter future for their 
offspring. Instead, he is bored with school and wants to earn his own money, which he is 
not in any way lacking from his parents. This is the irony created by the single child 
policy: the upwardly mobile and middle class children of those living in cities become the 
sole direction of their parents resources, whereas those living on the margins of society in 
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rural areas or ethnic enclaves are burdened with the government encouragement to have 
more than one child and further stretch their already lacking resources.  
Bo Yu Chen also exemplifies another social side effect of the one child policy, the 
so-called “little emperor” syndrome. Many are concerned about the rise of these “little 
emperors” or children who, growing up without any distraction from siblings, have the 
sole focus of six adults (parents and grandparents) and become spoiled by all of this 
attention. 15 With one child, incomes are channeled into buying better health care and 
education for their sole son or daughter and providing the most desirable brand name toys 
and clothes available.16 The cruise director, Campbell Ping He, even directly mentions 
this phenomenon found among his employees. “Most of them are single child in the 
family. They are like an apple in their mother’s eyes. So in my opinion, they are spoiled. 
They’re kind of self-centered. They don’t know how to care for the others but here they 
need to learn.”  
It becomes immediately apparent that although Jerry is in love with the idea of 
making money, he is hopelessly incapable of toning down his arrogant and self-entitled 
disposition to adequately perform the humble role of cruise ship waiter and porter. After 
he is dismissed because of complaints of laziness and grubbing for tips, Jerry remains 
unaffected by this reprimand and secure in his future prospects. In his interview with 
director Yung Chung, he simultaneously explains the difference between himself and the 
rural, female Shui Yu, and shows a shocking level of awareness of his own entitlement:  
                                                
15 Choi, Ching Y and Kane, Penny 
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Jerry Chen: “I don’t think I’m suited for this job. I’m very arrogant, I look down 
on everything. I think I was born with a silver spoon.”  
 
Yung Chung: “What will happen in your future?”  
 
Jerry Chen: “My parents will take care of me in the future. I’m very young. I’m 
19 years old. This is their responsibility.”  
 
Yung Chung: “Shui Yu is only 16”  
 
Jerry Chen: “We’re different. I come from a richer family. I can continue my 
studies, how can she do that? How can her parents support her? Well, my family 
can.”  
 
Chung also takes care to distinguish between these two visually, particularly 
contrasting their background when we are first introduced to them. As the camera sweeps 
over Shui’s family home on the banks of the river, lingering over the chickens pecking 
around inside and the water dripping through the cracks in the roof, he overlays Shui Yu 
describing how her family is lucky to have a home and good food to eat. Her 
thankfulness and dutifulness to her family is not wrapped up in her material possessions, 
she is grateful for everything she has. When we’re introduced to Chen Yu Bo, he’s 
lounging and smoking, forcing his friends to join him in a shot of Absolut Vodka in a 
sleek KTV or karaoke lounge, bemoaning his lack of money and talking down to his 
friends who are continuing their education.  The contrast between these two scenes, 
particularly the images and not the dialogue, says more than Chung’s narration could ever 
explain.  
When the two enter the ship, they become connected in their journey and the 
contrast between them is now evaluated not only by the viewer but also by their peers and 
coworkers. Another indication of this contrast is the roles they’re assigned in their new 
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jobs. The rural and urban bias manifests itself in the staff’s expectations of them as well 
as in the work they’re given. Chung uses parallel scenes to both connect and distinguish 
Jerry and Shui Yu: while he is greeting tourists at the front of the ship, Shui Yu is elbow 
deep in dirty dish water below deck; while Shui Yu dutifully writes home to her parents 
in bed, Jerry is sneaking into the girl’s cabin in his silk pajamas. However, the 
expectations of their abilities begins to shift as their true personalities break out of their 
stereotypes: we see more and more scenes of Shui Yu being embraced by her co-workers, 
often literally leading her by the hand to help her adjust to this new life. This is 
complimented by more and more shots of Jerry sitting alone and brooding, finally leading 
to him broodingly stalking off the ship after having been fired. The urban bias that had 
shaped their birth selection from the government is necessarily continued through their 
lives, but thankfully their true personality is eventually able to break through the 
stereotypes. Shui Yu proves herself to be a hard working and humble young woman, 
while Jerry proves himself to be a self-centered single child, or ‘little emperor’.  
 The characters shown in this film have undoubtedly been shaped by decisions made 
before their birth: only child versus oldest child, urban vs. rural, Han majority vs. Ethnic 
minority, but their outcomes are determined by their own agency. The one who has every 
advantage is the one who ultimately loses, while the one who is on the lowest rung of the 
social ladder is able to rise above her situation and improve her lot in life. Perhaps this is 
due to individual temperament but it is equally likely that the very circumstances that 
have separated the two have been the factors that have shaped their personalities the 
 29 
most. At the end of the film, the viewer is left with the feeling that Shui Yu has benefited 
more from her adversities than Jerry Chen has from his privilege.  
 
Future Social Ills Predicted in Please Vote for Me 
Please Vote for Me is another 2007 documentary, directed by Chinese national 
and Wuhan native Weijin Chen. The film was part of the BBC produced “Why 
Democracy” Series, which produced ten hour-long documentary features from over the 
globe featuring different aspects of contemporary democracy. The films were broadcast 
in over 48 countries in October 2007, by PBS in the United States and BBC in the U.K, 
but were not broadcast in Mainland China because of the sensitive nature of the subject.17 
Please Vote For Me is the documentation of a democracy experiment Chen conducted in 
a third grade classroom in the city of Wuhan: for the first time, the students and not the 
teachers will select their own Class Monitor.18 In China, the national elections take place 
only within the members of the Communist party and many of the top leaders are merely 
appointed and not elected, so to the children in Wuhan, free elections are a completely 
foreign process.19 
Despite the ostensible topic in this film being the meaning of democracy in China, 
the theme of single child pervasive throughout the narrative as with Up the Yangzte. The 
three main characters all eight year old only children and the film spends as much time, if 
not more, focusing on their relationship with their parents, their home life, and their 
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attitudes and relationships with each other, than on their thoughts on Democracy. The 
three children are Luo Lei, the son of the head of the police department and a 
policewoman, Cheng Cheng, the son of a divorced television producer and stepson of an 
engineer, and Xu Xiaofei, the daughter of a single-mother school administrator. The 
social position of their parents also plays a key role in determining not only how they’re 
treated, but also, possibly, the outcome of the election. Although these students’ only-
child status is certainly not unique, the close scrutiny given to their families draws our 
attention to this aspect of their character. 
Only children often have a stigma attached to them, especially in Western 
countries, where only children are an extreme minority of the demographic makeup of 
families. Many trace the association of only children with particular behavioral problems 
to an 1898 study, when the psychologist E. W. Bohannon undertook a study of "peculiar" 
children and concluded that only children were problematic.20 In 1906, Eugen Neter, a 
German pediatrician, published a clinical study that supported Bohannon's conclusion.21 
The psychologist G. Stanley Hall went so far as to make the famous declaration that 
"being an only child is a disease in itself."22 
As no one had studied only children in China before the one-child policy, Chinese 
scholars chose to follow the example of their Western colleagues and started by testing 
whether only children were "spoiled brats."23 Even the stereotypical terms for Chinese 
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only children came from the U.S. media: "Little Emperor," the most widely used term for 
Chinese only children in the 1980s, originated in a Newsweek article titled "A Rash of 
'Little Emperors.'"24 This article was translated and published in the popular Chinese 
newspaper Workers Daily 11 days later and introduced the term to the national psyche, 
from then on, terms like "little emperor," "little sun," and "little princess" were commonly 
applied to only children in China.  
The root in this phenomenon may lie with the Chinese focus on the family, 
particularly the success of younger generations. Traditionally, the Chinese value big 
families.25 Older members, parents and grandparents, usually live with or near their 
children and grandchildren; this is considered not only the duty of the children but also 
the logical life cycle of the family.26 Since the introduction of the Single Child Policy, 
however, the younger generations have been dwindled down to single son or daughter. 
Chinese educators have warned that the defining characteristics of families with "little 
emperors" is the "4-2-1 syndrome," meaning four grandparents and two parents 
pampering one child.27 Also, unlike many only-children in the West, Chinese only 
children are mostly from intact families and are healthy physically because Chinese 
parents often terminate a pregnancy if the fetus is found to have problems; the problems 
these children are likely to face involve the changing Chinese family values, the 
education system, and Chinese society.28 In the film, the little emperor syndrome 
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manifests itself as cronyism and aggression when confronted with the new concept of 
being judged by your peers.  
It is almost impossible to determine what would be normal single child to parent 
behavior given no frame of reference for normal, but there are several key scenes that 
indicate a level of involvement and participation in a child’s life that is above the average 
and seems to be encouraging bad behavior. Cheng Cheng is presented as the most 
pampered of all the three, as a chubby boy he is the stereotypical image of the overly 
coddled Chinese child (which has been associated with a growing number of adolescent 
obesity cases). He demands his parents write his homework for him, give him special 
advice for the election, and is prone to throwing temper tantrums when not given his 
immediate way. His reasons for wanting to be class monitor, at least those given in 
private to the camera and his parents, also ring true to the need for control that little 
emperors often display. He wants to be able to “boss people around” and “get to do what 
you want”: this is clearly the treatment he’s become used to at home and therefore 
expects to be given to him in every instance in his life. The scene that clearly made the 
editing process solely for the purpose of depicting Cheng Cheng as a “little emperor” was 
when his stepfather assists him in wiping himself after using the bathroom. This ten-
second scene resonates deeply as an almost cartoonish image of indulgence and coddling.  
Cheng Cheng’s tactics in the election also directly stem from his parents over 
indulgence at home: instead of a preparing a speech and a talent, he instead enlists his 
friends to sabotage his opponents by shouting and jeering during their speeches. But why 
would Cheng Cheng think that something should be achieved through hard work and 
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care? He’s never been taught that. Before the election begins we see him watching TV 
and lazing around on the couch in his underwear, while his mother finishes and corrects 
his homework assignments. Instead of preparing an instrument or dance for his talent 
piece, like his competitors, he only manages to barely memorize a pop song but is met 
with the most cheers from the audience: he knows how to work a crowd, at least. Later, 
when the speech that his parents have written for him to give during the debate proves too 
long to memorize, he throws a tantrum until his mother rewrites it.  
The entitlement and selfishness that Cheng Cheng displays both at home and in 
school is seemingly reprehensible to the audience, but his efforts are rewarded with a 
second place finish in the election, beating the earnest Xu Xiaofei. This pattern of 
approval and rewards for his bad behavior will likely carry out through the rest of his life 
either through his willingness to exploits his family connections or through his uncanny 
comprehension of how to underhandedly get what you want through intimidation and 
bribery, a problem that manifests itself in the corruption that plagues much of China’s 
business and government realm. A key aspect of this favoritism is never captured on film 
but was revealed by the director in an interview: Cheng Cheng was only selected to run 
for the Class Monitor position because his mother, the television producer, is a colleague 
of the director Chen and therefore helped him secure the approval of the school to film.29 
In return for her help, her son is to be featured prominently in the film and is awarded 
with a higher status in the class than his performance warrants. These quid pro quo 
bargains occur at every level of Chinese society, an important aspect of the concept of 
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guanxi or relationships, which dictates that one can only rise in business or social 
standing through mutually beneficial connections.  
The eventual winner of the Class Monitor election, by a wide margin, is Luo Lei, 
the son of the local police chief. Luo Lei had been selected by his teachers to be class 
monitor for the previous two years and seems confident about his chances for a 
reelection, but is more willing than Cheng Cheng to put the necessary work into gaining 
his classmates votes. During the first half of the film, Luo Lei repeatedly turns down his 
parents offer to help him with the election, preferring to “rely on his own strength.” In 
sharp contrast to Cheng Cheng, he says “I don’t want to control others, they should rely 
on themselves” in response to his parents insistence that he use tricks to get votes. To 
reinforce his independence, after a sequence of shots of children being carried into the 
elementary school by their parents during a rainy day, we see Luo Lei walking next to his 
father, squirming away from his protective hand in order to stride in confidently.  
Luo Lei’s parents are different from Cheng Chengs’; theirs is not blind 
encouragement but exacting and high standards that he must achieve. Perhaps because of 
their high social status they expect more from their son, but they are still more than 
willing to step in and help him achieve it. This channeling of all the energy into the one 
child is what is troublesome to many about the trend of “little emperors”: the parents of 
these only children are doing them no favors by protecting them from reality and spoiling 
them rotten. Indeed, when their own future support will likely depend on the successes of 
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the children, it would be in their own interest to ensure that the child is equipped with the 
necessary skills to succeed on their own. However, Luo Lei initially seems to want to be 
genuinely chosen by his peers, and at first works hard to impress them with his speech 
and flute performance. His contrast to Cheng Cheng is enhanced when he breaks down in 
tears and apologizes to Xiaofei for joining in mocking her with Cheng Cheng, his 
apology sincere while Cheng Cheng’s is shown as self-serving.  
However, his sincere attitude begins to shift when he sees how successful the 
competition have been, particularly Cheng Cheng. So, he begins to take a page out his 
book by adding a pop song to his traditional flute melody. But his is not the easy 
confidence of Cheng Cheng, he is more comfortable when he is in the position of power 
and able to exert his authority. He realizes that if he is going to beat Cheng Cheng, he’ll 
have to fight dirty too: His parents orchestrate a trip for his class on the monorail around 
Wuhan, he later uses his father’s advice about how to trick Cheng Cheng in the debate, 
and finally turns to straight bribery when he pass out Autumn Moon festival gifts to his 
classmates immediately before they vote. Whether his initial resolve to allow his peers to 
choose for themselves was just a front said for the benefit of the camera, or if he really 
meant it but was forced to use these tactics is unclear, but it is telling how quickly even 
the seemingly sincere Luo Lei sacrifices his ideals to win. As the little emperor 
generation ages, it seems clear that the lowest common denominator in terms of ethics 
will necessarily drag down all others.  
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The future of China likely rests on people like Cheng Cheng and Luo Lei, the 
corrupt official or the iron fisted military ranker; both have been struggling for power 
among the top ranks of the government for decades and, if the behavior of the little 
emperors is any indication, that fight will continue. A scene that exhibits this power 
struggle between these two boys not only satirizes it but forces the viewer to realize how 
easily democratic contests can devolve into petty power struggles, occurs immediately 
before the two boys’ debate. They stand side by side at a urinal, underhandedly criticizing 
the other’s style or chances and this macho debate gets decided as so many do: with an 
arm wrestling contest. The image of two young boys, one hand directing the flow of 
urine, the other busy wrestling across the urinal, lingers and seems to sum up perfectly 
the power dynamics between the privileged in China.  
The last contestant, overlooked not only by this paper until now but also by her 
male peers in the election, is Xu Xiaofei. Her mother laments her daughter’s less 
privileged position in comparison with her male candidate counterparts. Both these other 
boys are the only children of reasonably well off and well connected parents, who dote on 
their sons. Xu Xiaofei’s mother, however, is single and is only a lower level 
administrator at the school; she does not have the resources to offer the kind of help to 
Xiaofei that the other candidates are receiving. The underlying current, especially in the 
accusations that Xiaofei is a crybaby, is that a female candidate is not suited for this 
position of power and certainly won’t be able to beat her male competitors for the 
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position. Arguably, Xu Xiaofei is the most qualified candidate, she does not have the 
crony-ish tendencies of Cheng Cheng or the aggressive attitude of Luo Lei, but even she 
seems aware that she won’t be the candidate chosen. The patriarchy that dominated 
ancient China is still very much in effect today, and this can be seen not only through the 
selective birth of sons but also through the opportunities that those sons are afforded that 
is yet to come to the daughters.  
The outcome of the elections is suspiciously exactly along the lines of privilege 
that each child has: Luo Lei, the son of a high-ranking official in the city, wins in a 
landslide. Cheng Cheng, who although is the child of divorce, is still being raised by two 
parents with mid-level jobs, claims second place. But Xiaofei, the child of a single 
mother who is a low level education official, is almost completely left behind, a turn of 
events that will likely be similar to the opportunities she is afforded in the rest of her life. 
This election, democratic though it was, showed the same results as if the winner had 
been selected, so why did these students choose it? The simplest explanation is that Luo 
Lei was the class monitor last year and the students merely voted for the status quo. If 
this is so, it’s less troubling than the thought that eight year olds are discriminating based 
on class background and gender, but it indicates that this generation of little emperors is 
not interested in radical reform or change, they’d rather be gossiping or watching TV.  
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Conclusion 
The Single Child Policy was not the only factor that shaped the lives of the five 
main characters in the two films, but it has served to exacerbate and accentuate issues that 
would have presented challenges under normal circumstances. To introduce a completely 
artificial social constraint to a society plagued with more than enough naturally 
manifested problems, such as prejudice, corruption, and poverty, is sure to have 
disastrous effects on those who are already at risk. The effect of perpetuating these issues 
will also lead to a harder road for any democratic or social reforms that are hoped for in 
China. Up The Yangtze paints a more optimistic image of the future than Please Vote For 
Me, in that the more deserving character is rewarded for her hard work and fortitude. But 
in the end, the Jerry Chens and Cheng Chengs of the world will remain holding the upper 
hand, they will continue to be freely given much more than the Shui Yus and Xu Xiaofeis 
have to work hard to achieve.  
What does this say about the future of China? If those who have never learned the 
necessary skills to earn their positions are rewarded with power automatically, then the 
country will remain stagnate. Ancient China has often been lauded as one of the only true 
meritocracies in the Imperial age: although there was a dynastic Emperor in the throne, 
those with the real power were the bureaucrats who had to pass grueling examinations 
before being awarded with a position in the Imperial government. These positions could 
be won by any (male) subject, regardless of his background, and were not hereditary. If 
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China truly wants to be a global force in the future, it will need to return to this classical 
value and abandon its corrupt system of rewarding those who have the most connections. 
Although the One Child Policy could be a useful form of curbing population growth, the 
Chinese government will need to address the social issues that cause the inequality 
stemming from it if they want it to solve more problems than it causes.  
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Chapter Three 
Migrant Workers: Future Expectations and Changing Family Values  
Introduction 
 In China’s changing economic landscape, much of the burden of advancing society 
has been borne by the millions of factory and seasonal farm laborers who travel 
thousands of miles from their home to obtain jobs that will allow them to save for the 
future. Since the opening of the economy by Deng Xiaoping but particularly since the 
late 1990s, there has been an enormous increase not only in China’s GDP but in the 
amount of labor required to maintain this ballooning economy. Land workers from rural 
provinces, such as Sichuan in the south and the Henan/Hubei region, have left their 
ancestral villages, where there is no longer enough farming labor to sustain families, and 
headed to the enormous factories of Guangzhou and Shenzhen or the expansive fields of 
northern Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The profound influence this separation has not 
only on the workers themselves but also on their children and families is one of the most 
critical social issues facing China today.  
Unlike the films discussed in the last chapter, both of these films deal directly 
with the question of migrant workers and offer the perspective of the workers speaking 
openly about their situation. Like mismatched bookends, Last Train Home and Railroad 
of Hope show two very different perspectives on the life of the migrant worker but all 
rotate around the theme of travelling by rail to a job to better your life. Railroad of Hope 
shows the initial journey for many enthusiastic young people, about to become laborers in 
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the cotton fields of the Northwest, while Last Train Home shows the opposite story, with 
the worn out garment factory workers making the return journey to their hometown for 
their brief New Year’s break.  
It would be difficult not to read these two films as the beginning and ending of a 
tragic story, of cock-eyed optimism in one turned into hardened and bitter reality in the 
next. However, I will argue that the most prominent theme that can be extracted from 
both of these films is the improvement, over time, of conditions for the next generation; 
that the prosperity of one’s children is the ultimate goal for these workers. In Railroad of 
Hope, which chronicles the late 90s and early 2000s expansion of migrant workers, the 
ability to leave the countryside in search of work was the end goal for these young adults. 
Ten years later, in Last Train Home, the goal is for the children of the workers from the 
90s to not have to follow in their footsteps, to be able to support your children’s studies 
so they can leave the village but to attend university, not to join the factory. Although the 
reality of this sacrifice is often difficult to conceive, these two films are part of the 
narrative of the ongoing development and its effect on the rural population of future 
generations. The medium of film is key in conveying both the enormity of this 
movement, as well as the personalization of it, focusing on individuals’ stories in a way 
that statistics in a census report would never be able to.  
Another aspect to consider in analyzing the cultural and political message behind 
these films is the director’s point of view and the audience the film is made and marketed 
for; in the case of these films it was generally a European/American film festival 
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audience. Since the vast majority of the subjects of this film would not be part of the 
audience who would be seeing the final product, the question of the end goal of the film 
should be foremost in the minds of the viewer: why and for whom were the directors 
telling this story? If they were hoping to market them to Europeans and Americans, what 
was the intended response from the audience? These questions will be answered both 
through the directors’ own words (through interviews given during the films’ release) as 
well as reading their intentions within the films. The role of the director is markedly 
distinct in the production of each of these films but their stated goal overlap on a key 
issue: to educate the Western consumers of the goods produced by these laborers and 
hopefully to inspire them to protest the conditions under which their products are made 
and the lives lead by the workers who make them. The focus on a family in Last Train 
Home and the emotionally charged questions of Railroad of Hope both achieve an 
empathetic reaction from the audience and perhaps this is the tactic that the director 
hopes will drive the audience to action, or at least to seek more knowledge.  
Before exploring these issues within the films themselves, it is necessary to first 
understand how this culture of the migrant worker or “floating population” was allowed 
to emerge and what are the economic and political realities of these workers today.  
 
History and Demographics of Chinese Migrant Workers 
 As with many social and economic issues facing modern China, the causes of the 
massive internal migration are complex and numerous. In addition to the general 
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complications surrounding the history of Chinese migrant workers, obtaining reliable and 
up to date statistics about the workers is difficult owing to the CCP’s reluctance to release 
their census data as well as the probability that the data released is an extremely low 
estimate of the actual number. According to the official Chinese news agency Xinhua 
reporting on a report issued in January of 2012 by the National Bureau of Statistics, the 
number of people not living in the places of their registered residence for more than six 
months last year was 271 million, up 9.77 million from 2010.1 
 This number is likely not entirely accurate. An outside report by Kam Wing Chan 
of the University of Washington has compiled statistics which show that in 2005, the 
most recent period for which reliable statistics are available, there was a gross migration 
of about 230 million Chinese spending most of the year away from their home town or 
village. He also forecasts another 100 million rural residents could move to cities by 
2020.2 If the number was 230 million in 2005, then with the exponential increase 
expected by 2020, 270 is an extremely low estimate for the 2011 statistic. However, 
knowing the numbers does not help to understand the factors that have caused this 
massive amount of people, almost equivalent with the entire population of the United 
States, to leave their homes for the better part of a year. For this answer, the history of 
rural life in China as well as the massive changes brought about by the various leaders of 
the PRC, is necessary.  
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 For the vast majority of it’s 5000-year history, China had a primarily rural 
population and was almost entirely an agricultural economy. Not until very recently, 
meaning the first half of the 20th century, was any significant part of China industrialized 
or urban. With millions of acres of tillable land in the central provinces, and each area 
ideal for harvesting a different crop, the majority of the population worked on the land, 
providing food for themselves as well as their local markets.3 Internal migration before 
the Communist Revolution was almost impossible: the extreme few who were able to 
leave their home village were those who had passed the grueling imperial examination 
and were therefore granted a bureaucratic post either in their provincial capital or the 
imperial capital in Beijing.4 With the Republican Revolution in 1911, there was an 
increase in movement to cities, particularly towards the treaty ports of Shanghai and 
Hong Kong because of their modern imports from the Western countries that colonized 
them, but this again was an extremely small percentage of people. The vast majority still 
relied on subsistence farming as a means of support and was tied to the land.5   
 After the Communist Revolution in 1949, the CCP began to crack down on the 
chaotic movements that had occurred over the previous decade of war. Beginning in 
1952, there were several measures designed to prevent internal migration to cities, which 
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4 Ibid. 572 
5 Ibid. 663 
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culminated in the establishment of the Hukou system in 1958.6 A Hukou is a residency 
permit based on family register system and controls where citizens are legally permitted 
to live.7 Although the central authority of the CCP claimed that this was a measure to 
ensure the stability of the new nation, it mainly functioned as an instrument of the 
command economy: the government could directly control the placement of the labor 
force and could therefore ensure an adequate supply of rural laborers for the many state-
owned businesses.8 Those who did not register their household were denied grain rations, 
employee housing, health care, or, in some cases, access to education and marriage 
permits.9 Adherence to this system was strictly enforced until the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1976, and punishment for those who were found outside of their designated 
region could be expulsion from the cities or placement in detention centers.10  
 After Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1980 and his sweeping economic reforms of 
the next decade, the enforcement of the Hukou system became increasingly laxer. Many 
could now unofficially migrate and get a job without a valid permit. Although Deng had 
made agricultural reforms in the countryside, the wealth flowing into the coastal cities 
created pressures that encouraged migration from the interior. This new economy also 
provided incentives for officials not to enforce regulations on migration; the laborers 
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were now needed to fill the industrial jobs being created. Further relaxation of the system 
has happened since the 1990s: A provision was made to allow the rural resident to buy 
"temporary urban residency permits" so the resident could work legally within the 
cities.11 China's accession to the World Trade Organization has also forced leaders to 
allow some reformation to Hukou in order to liberate the movement of labor for the 
benefit of the economy.12 However, a 2008 study from the University of Washington, 
argues that these reforms have not fundamentally changed the Hukou system, but have 
only decentralized the powers of Hukou to local governments. The present Hukou system 
remains active and continues to contribute to China's rural and urban disparity.13 
 This history has lead to the predicament China is now facing: a ‘Floating’ or non-
resident population mostly living illegally in the cities is their main hard-labor workforce 
and therefore is driving the staggering economic gains of the past decade. There are 
myriad social ills plaguing these workers ranging from access to education and housing, 
to mental health problems that have lead to an epidemic of suicides, famously at the 
FoxConn plant in Shenzhen over the course of 10 months in 2010.14 Migrant workers 
living in the city are often not legally employed and therefore are not able to be a part of 
a local Danwei, or work unit, which organizes the social needs of a workforce including 
school for children, healthcare, housing, and often family planning approval such as 
                                                
11 Webster, Chris and Zhao, Yanjing. 17. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Buckingham, Will and Chan, Kam. “Is China Abolishing the Hukou System?” The China Quarterly. 
2008. 582-606.  
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marriage licenses and birth planning.15 The migrant workers must find a place to live 
illegally, and because of the lack of security and access to the school systems, they will 
often leave their children behind in the rural provinces with elderly relatives. Those who 
do bring their children are forced to form volunteer schools, which are often shut down 
by the local government.16 
 The reasons a laborer would be willing to risk the possible punishment and the 
definite exploitation of a job in the cities is this is the only viable option to support 
children. China’s agricultural sector is no longer based on smaller family farms but is 
industrialized into larger companies and requires fewer workers, therefore those who 
might have remained in the village are now forced to seek gainful employment 
elsewhere. Who the profits from this employment will end up supporting, whether it is a 
permanent state for these workers, and how this displacement and separation has affected 
the personal lives of all involved, particularly the children, is examined in the following 
two films.  
 
Shifting Cultural Values in Railroad of Hope 
 The 2002 documentary feature Railroad of Hope, directed by Ning Ying, is only 56 
minutes but features over 30 interviews with men and women, from the elderly to 
children, who are leaving their native Sichuan province in the South West of China to 
work as a seasonal cotton picker in the far Northwestern Province of Xingjiang. The land 
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is flatter, they’ve been told, the wages better and the taxes less steep. Many of the 
interviewees have never left their home village, less have ever been on a train. Some 
workers pile onto the train cars with an optimism that could only be the product of 
naiveté, others with the steely-eyed resolve that hints at years of discouragement. With 
the broad variety of interviewees, the film never lingers long on one particular story line 
or one specific aspect of this great migration. Instead Ning paints a broad picture of the 
plight of migrant workers, allowing the viewer to make the necessary connections and 
draw their own inferences.  
 This film differs from all the other features that have or will be discussed in that it 
does not focus its narrative on a particular individual or family as the stand in for a 
broader issue. Instead, Ying attempts to pack her hour-long film with as many characters 
and interviews as possible, never revisiting a narrative thread or showing the resolution of 
a conflict. In this way she breaks free from the narrative constraints that are typically 
enforced on even documentary features. Paradoxically, much of her framing shows that 
she is primarily interested in the characters and their stories. Where many other 
documentaries tend to place their characters in their environment by favoring long shots, 
Ying stays in the close-up for most of the film, focusing on the faces of the interviewees 
and lingering in this frame for longer than necessary, forcing both the interviewees and 
the audience to come to terms with the emotions and information before them. Ning Ying 
said in an interview about this subject: "If a film has to be approved, there is so much 
discussion between the filmmakers and the subjects and then the filmmakers and the film 
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bureau about which reality you can show and which reality you cannot show. So I said 
OK, lets try to make a documentary not to build up a miracle, but to catch a miracle as it 
is happens in real life."17 
 Ying, however, does not break the typical mold in how she portrays the role of the 
director. Instead of fading into the background like Lixin Fan in Last Train Home or 
involving his own story in the film as Chung does in Up The Yangtze, she compromises 
with these two extremes and remains an unseen but definitely heard and felt presence and 
necessarily so. Her interview questions are what shapes the story that is told and what 
questions she chose, which ranged from “have you been on a train before” to “what is 
happiness to you”, influenced the way the characters presented themselves and also how 
they evaluated their journey. In a film that relies almost exclusively on interviews the 
director’s agenda and purpose becomes clear almost immediately, and her purpose is 
evaluating the emotional toll that this labor system has taken on these migrant workers. 
Her more nuanced purposes are less clear, however.  
 The core of her search is not to elucidate that this system of seasonal workers 
travelling hundreds of miles from home to seek decent wages is detrimental to the mental 
health and social stability of these workers; that is self-evident. Instead, the overriding 
theme of these interviews is the reason behind this sacrifice, which is for some the hope 
for a better future for the next generation. Uniformly, every adult with children 
depending on them lists their children’s success as chief among the reasons to make this 
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long and excruciating trip: the more money they can earn, the more chance their child has 
to prosper.  
This reason may seem purely altruistic and a drastic sacrifice that Western parents 
would be unlikely to make for their children but the parents are not without their own 
interests. The importance of family is paramount in Chinese society, but not necessarily 
the togetherness or closeness of a family but the prosperity and longevity of a certain 
family line.18 The living are indebted to the ancestors for their own lives and repay them 
not only by honoring their shrines but also by ensuring that the next generation will 
continue to climb in prestige, therefore allow them to honor their ancestors in more 
grandiose ways. Therefore, what could seem like a purely economic enterprise of seeking 
higher wages far from home is also supported by millennia of traditions about filial piety 
and the importance of increasing prosperity throughout the generations. One interviewee, 
an older woman, succinctly explains this mentality: “[Migrating for work] is for 
preserving the clan, our elders did everything for us, we do everything for our children. 
Every generation should be better than the last.” 
Given an extremely limited filming location, a Sichuan train station and the 
interior of train cars on the route to Xinjiang, Ying makes use of the little room for 
creative maneuvering in unexpected ways. What at first seems to be an odd soundtrack 
motif, namely a very gauche version of Beethoven’s Fur Elise and Mozart’s Piano 
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Concerto in C, is made clear at the end of the film. What initially appeared to be non-
diegetic sound melds seamlessly to reveal that it was in fact being broadcast on the train 
cars as a alarm clock. Ying’s emphasis of this strange choice by the railway line could 
indicate many things, including the railroad’s manufactured sense of prestige and comfort 
which contrasts harshly with the images of the cramped and crowded cars, limbs 
sprawling and dust from the Gobi spilling in.  
It could also be a nod to the audience: Ying screened this film at many European 
film festivals and it won the Grand Prix for documentary at the Cinemá du Réel Film 
Festival in Paris, 2002. Keeping her audience in mind, he might have wanted the jarring 
effect of hearing such familiar music but seeing it associated with extremely unfamiliar 
images. The discord caused by this juxtaposition might be part of the effect he wishes to 
achieve in his audience; a realization of this disparity causes cultural tension. Already 
intending to play on the materialistic guilt of the audience, the reminder of their own 
luxuries and way of life in stark contrast to those of the workers is an intentional jab at 
the heartstrings.  In an interview, Ying said that she made this movie to “tell the truth” 
and to show the realities of these people’s lives to those who would not be privy to them 
otherwise. She explains that in regards to this goal, she needs to overcome the gaps in 
culture, space and time between the subjects and the audience. “The most important thing 
is searching the deepest common resonance between yourself behind the camera, and 
your subject in front of the camera. When you find it you will overcome any problem of 
 52 
artistic form, or productive limitation and even the differences of race or culture.”19 Her 
use of western music might be one way she bridges the gap, but it also serves to 
strengthen the contrast.  
Ying has taken this massive movement of people and made it feel massive and 
impersonal, which is difficult to capture in films. Her quick changes and brief interviews 
almost overwhelm the viewer, and within an hour she has displayed every variety of 
character but has united them by making clear the goal that they share: prosperity. What 
divides them is the ultimate end of that prosperity. For many of the younger interviewees, 
they have already left school and are now solely interested in making as much money as 
possible, for their own ends, to be able to fully participate in the new consumer culture 
that is gripping New China. These are the children who were raised during the most 
drastic changes that China’s economy was undergoing and although they want to improve 
their material situation, they are not yet able to conceive of a time when a peasant worker 
might be able to attend university and become a wage worker. They exist in the middle 
stages of the transition between a communist and market economy: they are no longer 
able to support themselves through merely farming in their home villages like their 
parents, but they are not able to break out of the peasant cycle completely through 
gaining an education or more skilled labor work and therefore are forced into migration 
to find manual labor. The industrialization and modernization of a society, especially one 
that developed as quickly as China, is built on the back of these workers.  
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This is in direct contrast with the adults who are being interviewed, those with 
young children. These workers are hoping to earn money, yes, but to facilitate the 
education of their children and to lift their future family out of poverty and into the life of 
a respected member of modern society. More than one child who has been brought on the 
trip expresses the desire to serve in the police force when they grow up and their parents 
beam proudly behind them, knowing that this journey makes this dream one more step 
closer to possible. These children are the next link in the development chain, they 
represent the promise that there will eventually be a break in the cycle of the countryside, 
that this youngest generation will have the education and opportunities that was not 
possible for their parents or even those in their early twenties, just the previous 
generation. The drastic changes occurring between each generation is a mark of the 
compressed modernization that is happening in China.20 Ying’s final shot is of the sun 
rising over the Gobi at the beginning of the final day of travel and she lingers on the 
groups of families as they breakfast together in the bright morning light. The image of the 
family is what we’re left with as the film closes and it’s no accident the message of 
family is what we take away.  
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The Future Reality in Last Train Home 
Last Train Home, a 2009 documentary directed by Lixin Fan, chronicles a period 
of three years in the life of the Zhang family, from early 2006 to late 2008. The Zhang’s 
are a family from rural Sichuan but the father and mother live 2000 kilometers away in 
Guangzhou working in a textile factory. The film mostly focuses on the two weeks a year 
during the Lunar New Year when the parents are able to travel home to see their children, 
eleven-year-old son Yang and 16 year old daughter Qin. The children, who have 
remained in Sichuan, maintain the family’s small farm and attend school, while being 
cared for by their grandmother. The film depicts three separate New Year’s trips and as 
this event passes each year we can see further deterioration in the family structure. The 
parents hope that with the money they make they will be able to support both of their 
children’s continued studies and hopeful progression on to college and a more highly 
skilled career. The effects of these desires on the eldest, Qin, becomes the focus of both 
the film and the family, finally culminating in her abandoning her studies, leaving the 
family farm behind, and taking first a factory job and then a job in a nightclub in 
Shenzhen. The film ends on an uncertain note, with Qin not making the trip home for the 
last New Year’s celebration 
 Through the Zhangs, Fan, a former journalist with the Chinese state broadcaster 
CCTV who now lives in Montreal, tells the story of the hundreds of millions of Chinese 
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migrant workers.21 As Fan himself said in an interview, “It’s a family drama that serves 
as an allegory about where China is heading and the profound changes it has gone 
through, from being an agricultural society to an industrial nation. It’s a huge story.” 
How Fan combines the elements of narrative or personal and logical story, while also 
depicting the greater realities of the phenomenon is achieved mainly through his style as 
a director and his ability to be an outside observer.  
 Fan quickly distinguishes himself from many other current documentary auteurs by 
aligning himself strictly with the cinéma vérité style, which involves a more naturalistic 
and observationalist method of filming.22 Fan does not make his presence known, either 
on camera or through voice-of-god narration. The only influence the director exerts is in 
cinematography and editing stages: there are no interviews, no graphics, and no non-
narrative images. There are several moments in this film, however, where the authenticity 
of the moment is questionable due to the family’s reaction to the camera.  Qin even says, 
in an extremely emotional moment, “you wanted to film the real me, this is it!” This 
could be simply acknowledging the position of the director in the film, but whether this 
outburst would have occurred without the added strain of their lives being chronicled, is 
uncertain. Fan also exerts his editorial stance in his soundtrack choices, which although 
sparse, help to emphasize his supposed agenda. For example, after Qin has left her family 
and moved to Shenzhen, he depicts her receiving a haircut in a fashionable salon, he uses 
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a Chinese girl pop song to emphasize her desire to become part of this culture she has 
never experienced.  
The style Fan employs also allows him to seamlessly weave together the story of 
this particular family with the larger story of the migrant worker in China. His repeated 
use of the long shot, particularly when the character being filmed is in the background 
space of the frame, is a technique employed so that the audience will not only focus on 
this particular story but on the environment the character is inhabiting, be it a lush corn 
field in Sichuan or a grimy cafeteria in a worker’s dormitory. The larger narrative of the 
inequality and hardship of the lives of these workers is found at the edges of the frame. 
When he is interviewing Father Zhang during his factory shift, we see the babies of his 
fellow workers nestled among the piles of fabrics on the factory floor, the questions of 
the origin of that narrative are never answered, that is someone else’s story.  
When he does work in the close-up, Fan is careful to linger for longer than would 
be typical in a narrative film, certainly, but also longer than the time allowed in most 
documentaries. An early scene that shows a phone conversation between Qin and her 
mother, the camera holds a steady on her as she runs the gamut of emotions while 
speaking with her far-away daughter. This lingering shot is the first indication in the film 
that there is tension in the family, particularly between these two women and Fan’s 
camera’s insistence is what captures it. Another of the rare close-ups occurs when, during 
the first New Years meal, the parents are expressing their hope that Qin will study hard 
and succeed in school the camera catches all of Qin’s uncomfortable reactions to this 
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pronouncement. We are offered a hint at her feelings before she has the chance to express 
them openly, we are being asked to put ourselves in the frame of mind of this teenager.  
Although the character the audience judges the most harshly is also the one we are 
asked to identify with and focus on most closely. To the Western audiences of the film, 
the sacrifice of the Zhang parents is almost unfathomable and the rebellious and 
ungrateful reaction of their daughter is designed to draw ire. We are first hand witnesses 
to the hardships her parents have suffered in order to send money home for their children, 
but the film is challenging us to put ourselves in the shoes of Qin, who does not see the 
conditions her parents live in or really fully understand the sacrifices they are making on 
her behalf. Qin has spent her entire life seeing her parents only once a year, feeling 
abandoned and disconnected from them. She says in one scene: “My parents didn’t raise 
me, they barely lived with me, how can there be any feeling?” She feels that they have 
left their children behind for the selfish pursuit of money in the city. Her actions may 
seem like that of a spoiled child, but more accurately they are those typical of any angst-
ridden teen in the world and her desire is not for luxuries but for freedom, freedom to 
make her own money in the city. “I thought I’d like to work in a factory but I can’t really 
get used to it here. Am I happy? After all, freedom is happiness.”  
 The film was an official selection for documentary at many film festivals in the 
United States and Europe, including Sundance Film Festival, and it was on the short list 
for best documentary in 2009 Academy Awards. Like Railroad of Hope, Fan is catering 
to a Western audience but does so in a very different way and for some different 
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motivations. Part of his motivation is to show some of the Western consumers of the 
products where their goods are made and what they are supporting with their purchases. 
Although he is also critical of the Chinese government for allowing these conditions for 
their workers, he is mainly critical of those in the West for allowing this “labor to feed 
their greed”.23 In an interview, Fan stated, “I wish the Western audience would think 
about the relationships between themselves and their lifestyles. I want them to think that 
their life is somehow connected to how these migrant workers live and their sufferings. 
And we don’t bother to think why our life is like this. Things are cheap because someone 
else has paid, and it’s not being projected on the price tag. I think we consume too much 
here in the developed world.”24 
Fan’s sentiment is carried out through several scenes and images he chose to 
include in the film. In one of the opening shots, we see pallets of cargo being loaded onto 
freight ships, and if there was any doubt about their destination the words “Made in 
China” are emblazoned in English on the side of each crate. Another scene later in the 
film shows a male worker in Qin’s garment factory lifting a pair of jeans from the 
completed pile and scoffing: “Forty-inch waistline? You can fit two Chinese in that.” The 
brand name jeans also feature later, when Qin laments that she would never be able to 
afford this name brand and jokes about taking some home with her. The connection with 
the Western, likely American, consumer is omnipresent but the gap between those who 
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make the clothes and those who wear them seems to be expanding at the same rate as the 
waistlines on the jeans.  
 The style differences between the two directors also present two different sides of 
the same coin: Fan achieves his emotional resonance not by overwhelming the audience 
with the number of stories presented in a single train ride but by tracking the real life 
implications of this migrant worker trend over several years of change in one family. The 
audience members might see aspects of their own children in Qin’s profanity laden 
outburst towards the end of the film, or be able to understand the strained relationship 
between mother and daughter. His emphasis on family as the genesis for this entire trend 
is even more overt than in the previous film and his equal attention on both the daughter 
and the parents gives equal sympathy to the contending sides of this issue. Where Ying 
made the staggering number of migrant workers feel staggering, Fan made it feel 
personal and relatable. 
However, Fan shows the second half of the story begun by Ying. The workers in 
Railroad of Hope who expressed the hope that their children would benefit from their 
sacrifice could have been the Zhangs as they share the same goal. Sadly, we see that these 
wishes and the promise they held for these workers, do not always come to fruition. His 
question is no longer “what is the cause of this migration” because the presumed benefit 
to the family as a cause is clear, but the question has become “does migrating vast 
distances to work actually benefit or hurt the family?” The daughter does not go to 
college, like her parents hoped, but rather follows them into the life of a migrant worker 
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precisely because she feels so disconnected from them and their sacrifice and hopes for 
her. Fan said in an interview, “I wanted to find a family that had been separated for 10 to 
20 years – the same period that China has been opening up,” says Fan. “One whose 
children are at the age when they need to decide about what to do about their future: 
whether to stay on the farm or to leave like their parents.”25 Fan also seems to be asking 
by the end of the film if the daughter’s choice is indeed the ungrateful one it appears 
initially? The answer to this is less clear and remains to be seen, as millions of young 
adults in China like Qin are currently living this experience.  
 
Conclusion 
The population is aging. It may become old before it becomes rich. The parents’ 
generation have been working in factories for 20, 30 years. Soon, they will have to retire 
and return to the countryside. And the younger generation of migrant workers, they 
would come out and work in the factory, but they grew up along with China’s opening 
up, so they are adopting a lot of new ideas and they want to be free and they are 
embracing individualism. There’s no way you can send all those people back when they 
grow old. Will China be strong enough to provide all these job opportunities and build 
enough cities to house all these people? It’s going to be a big challenge.  
Corporations find ways to make things cheaper. They outsource their production 
to developing countries, but the workers don’t have much bargaining power. And, 
especially for countries like China, with very little labor rights, they cannot fight back. 
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How will the Chinese government respond? They need to have a stable society and they 
need to get all these people employed, their 1.3 billion people. What can the leaders do? 
If they raise their labor costs through higher salaries and worker benefits, he corporations 
will just move the factory to countries with lower costs, such as Vietnam, India, or 
Thailand. The chain of globalization has made these questions much more difficult to 
answer.  
China faces a crisis of development that has never been faced by a global 
superpower. They have been undergoing their major development and industrialization at 
a time of unparalleled media coverage and global information sharing. All modern first 
world countries were able to industrialize by exploiting cheap labor and benefiting from 
poor health and safety standards for their workers. Though the United States and Great 
Britain now have labor unions and labor laws to protect their workers, little more than a 
hundred years ago the conditions in these countries were little better than those found in 
China today. The difference is that China faces global scrutiny and criticism for its labor 
problems, which are, in fact, a natural process of the development cycle.  
This understanding of the issue doesn’t excuse the abuses that have been 
perpetrated by companies like FoxConn or heal the wounds of the millions of workers, 
like those portrayed in the two films, but it does widen the frame to allow the larger 
picture to emerge. This is a picture that the adult workers of the films can see glimmering 
in the distance: a time when China has fully industrialized and enjoys the same labor 
protections of other first-world countries. The long-term goal of the migrant workers 
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understands this system of temporary hardship more than most of its criticizers, which is 
the bettering of the future for the future generations.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Opening Up: A Consumer Infatuation and a Globalized Backlash 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, domestic consumption will be the main driver of China's economic growth 
in 2012, with a growth of up to fifteen percent. This is the first time in a decade that 
consumer consumption will surpass government investment. The major consumer group 
will remain urban residents, despite the faster growth of per capita incomes for rural 
residents. Urban residents with a disposable income, often classified as China’s 
burgeoning middle class, continue to spend mainly on real estate, cars, and luxury items 
such as brand name clothing and interior decorations.61 
These figures represent the maturation of a trend that has been growing for the 
past several decades, arguably since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms of the 80s and 
90s. The current generations, in a marked departure from their predecessors, are eagerly 
entering the consumer marketplace in order to advance their personal income. Today’s 
youth represent China’s first generation whose lives have, from the very beginning, been 
accompanied by the country’s reform and opening up with no lived experience of Maoist 
socialism. Thus, their identity construction is being played out in a dramatically different 
socio-cultural context compared with previous generations. China’s urban children and 
youth today are known to enjoy material prosperity and well being unimaginable to 
previous generations. The sustained double-digit growth in GNP in the past two decades 
has led to much greater purchasing power for urban families. Today’s urban youth are 
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known to be brand conscious and fashion-savvy, the consumption of the Western brands 
Nike or McDonald’s has become a symbol of material modernity and new cultural 
expressions in China. They find themselves at the center of material comfort, rampant 
consumerism, and broadened access to information across the world.62  
The post-1989 generation has often been called the Me-Generation, reflecting 
their rampant materialism and self-involvement.  
The road to this materialism has been long and varied, and in order to understand 
the ideals that are held by this current generation, it is first necessary to examine those 
held by previous generations.  
 
History of the Opening Up and Reform Era 
 
 China’s rise features a new pattern of compressed development that combines 
political flexibility with formal policies and informal practices reflecting China’s multiple 
traditions. A variety of economic processes of Sinicization will inflect globalization in 
the same way that Americanization and other civilization processes have done. The late a 
country starts the process of industrialization, the more organizational power is needed to 
protect domestic producers against foreign competitors, to mobilize limited capital and to 
target those industries that had proved successful. In compressed development, different 
stages and sequences of development are collapsed into a single point in time. As a result, 
developing countries face very different international and domestic conditions than did 
late developers only a few decades ago. Compressed development has always had a 
social dimension, with the clash of traditional, modern, and post modern practices and 
                                                
62 Liu, Fengshu. Urban Youth in China: Modernity, the Internet, and the Self. New York, NY: Routledge, 
2011.58 – 60.  
 65 
values. Therefore, China’s very economic rise has caused its social problems such as 
corruption, poor labor standards, environmental problems, and wealth gap. Do these 
challenges fully occupy all the informational and logistical capacities of the Chinese 
state?63 
 Particularly since Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 “Southern Inspection Tour,” the Chinese 
government has “internationalized” China, opening the country to a wide variety of 
international economic and cultural forces. This is part of the concerted effort to make 
China rich, to raise the standard of living of the population, and offer a varied cultural 
life. Importantly, the increase of the social status of the new moneyed middle class was 
tied to the stability of the CCP, the CCP would make them rich and they would return 
with their loyalty. In contrast the educated generation of the 1980s who were searching 
for life’s meaning, which ended in the massacre in Tiananmen, this generation is openly 
success oriented. The regime has placed an emphasis on performance and material 
success in order to legitimate their power and are actively encouraged value as the key 
indicator of worth. The state lost its legitimacy in 1989 for many youth and so out-dated 
appeals to discredited ideology were no longer a useful tool for gaining support. There 
was a power societal reaction against the extreme asceticization of Chinese life under 
Mao and the subsequent downfall of his ideal lead to a desire for material wealth and a 
suspicion of all moral values.64  
After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China developed a modern industrial 
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sector, which stimulated modest but significant economic growth by the 1930s.65 Foreign 
investment in many areas of China, particularly Hong Kong and Shanghai, helped 
improve China’s global influence and trade connections. Before the collapse of 
international trade that followed the onset of the Great Depression, China’s share of 
world trade and its ratio of foreign trade to GDP achieved levels that were not regained 
for over sixty years.66  
The barely-established economy was heavily disrupted by the war against Japan 
and the Chinese Civil War from 1937 to 1949, after which the victorious Communist 
Party installed a planned economy, with a focus on the state-owned industrial sector.67 
Afterwards, the economy largely stagnated and was disrupted by the Great Leap Forward 
famine, which killed between 30 and 40 million people, and the purges of the Cultural 
Revolution further depleted the economy. Urban Chinese citizens experienced virtually 
no increase in living standards from 1957 onwards, and rural Chinese had no better living 
standards in the 1970s than the 1930s.68 
The economic performance of China during this era was particularly poor in 
comparison with other East Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  
The economy was riddled with huge inefficiencies and malinvestments, and with Mao's 
death in 1976, the CPC leadership was faced with the problem of salvaging a failing 
economy.69 After Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1980, the party elite decided to 
endorse his market-oriented reforms, which involved agricultural reforms through land 
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privatization, allowing private businesses and market pricing, and, most importantly, 
allowing foreign investment in special economic zones, including Shenzhen, Shanghai, 
and Guangzhou.70 These and more radical reforms continued into the 1990s, including 
the reduction of tariffs, trade barriers, and regulations. The leaders since Deng’s death in 
1997 have generally continued his reform-minded agenda and have seen a steady growth 
of the economy since.  
The main criticism that these reform policies have faced is the widening of the 
inequality gap between the rich and poor, with the urban elite and burgeoning middle 
class seeing almost all of the benefits from this economic expansion, while those in the 
countryside have been mostly left behind.71 This criticism also indicates that the 
complacency created by the urban elite will lead to a generation without any social or 
political motivation, a generation fueled by consumption and lacking in compassion for 
the poor or disenfranchised. Public opinion polls of this urban middle class shows their 
chief concerns to lie with accumulating material possessions or social prestige, and that 
the revolutionary or reformation fervor that characterized the previous generations has all 
but disappeared.72  
In addition to breaking with many of the cultural values of the Communist Era, 
the current youth have begun to reject many much more ancient Chinese values, 
particularly the Confucian values that characterized proper social interaction for more 
than two millennia. Instead of focusing on the collective, in general, the Chinese youth of 
today display a drive towards individual goals. Chinese urban youth’s individualism has a 
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double emphasis on individual freedom and material achievement, valuing both self-
expression and materialism. The two forms that this individualism takes in China today 
align closely with those outlined by American sociologist Robert Bellah: the utilitarian 
individualist and the expressive individualist.73  
The utilitarian generation is more easily defined as the ku generation, which is a 
transliteration of the English word cool, which represents the stylish and the fun. It 
clearly represents an individualism that is much influenced by Western pop culture and 
the values it represents, with its reference on modernity and individuality. An important 
phrase for them is “it is most important to have fun.”74 The youth of the utilitarian 
individualism are preoccupied with social economic mobility through making money and 
gaining social power. Their lifestyle goals resemble the middle-class life in Western 
developed societies. Bill Gates is a popular role model, only in his role as a successful 
entrepreneur and richest man in the world; also many disaffected youth are obsessed with 
his lack of a college degree. However, his charity work is always forgotten.75 
Expressive individualism holds that each person has a unique core of feeling and 
intuition that should unfold or be expressed if individuality is to be realized. It usually 
arises in opposition to and rebelling against the more pervasive utilitarian individualism. 
This style of individualism doesn’t focus on the individual aspect but rather the 
expressive aspect; the key here is to find your own passion and to master it. The 
individual piece is merely the realization that the truest form of expression is what is 
expressed personally, from a unique place for the individual. This is the aspect that most 
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deviates from the utilitarian individualism, which can be expressive if that suits its 
purpose, but individualism here is not practiced for its own sake. It is a necessary part of 
the self-discovery and self-development that comes with true expression.  
The two following films display both of these styles of individualism, with the 
utilitarian individualism on display by the “ku” seeking girls in Super, Girls! while the 
more fringe actors in Follow Your Heart are seeking a more authentic type of 
individuality in their reappropriation of the hip hop culture.  
 
 
False Promises in Super, Girls! 
 
 The 2008 documentary Super, Girls! by director Jian Yi was inspired by the 
massively successful 2005 television competition show Super Girl Contest, a female 
singing contest in the style of American Idol and Pop Idol from the U.K. After the 
enormous popularity the show’s first season winner, Li Yunchun, received, the second 
season’s audition rounds attract more girls than ever and Yi chronicles the several day 
audition process for the Shenyang regional contest. Shenyang is the provincial capital of 
Liaoning, the northeastern province most close to Beijing and therefore the closest 
regional competition for all Beijing singers. The top eight singers from the Shenyang 
region will go to the National finals in Chang’sa, Hunan, and will compete against all of 
the other provincial regions for the national title.   
 Director Yi points to his contemporaries in documentary films and their topics of 
choice as the main reason he chose this to make the film. “I feel that many filmmakers 
choose to focus on the margins of society, which can be good to give them a voice, but I 
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often feel that mainstream Chinese culture is not adequately represented in these films.”76 
In 2006, the defining feature of mainstream youth culture was arguably the Super Girl 
singing contest and the cultural phenomenon that it represented also illuminated many of 
the deeper social insecurities inherent in an entirely pop and glamor based culture. In the 
first few scenes of the film, Yi interviews several different young women, including a 
college student from Beijing, an unemployed waitress from Shenyang, and a young 
online blogger, all of whom are auditioning to be Super Girls. These women are not only 
connected by their musical ambitions but more importantly by their desire for some kind 
of social recognition. In fact, the musical aspect seems to take a back seat to the glamour 
of being in the contest as the goal. Their lack of passion for the expressive side of the 
contest is summed up when one says, “Well, I don’t want to get an internship or 
something, so I thought, why not try for Super Girl?” 
 After following the failed auditions of several of these young women, Yi focuses 
the majority of the film on Wang Yunan, a local seventeen year old who had already 
passed the first round for Shenyang but returned to the audition location daily to sell pens 
to the newcomers as well as to “seek out my rivals”. Wang then appoints herself not only 
the arbiter of knowledge for all things Super Girl but also the de facto guide for the film. 
She stands outside the audition hall making a classic sales pitch for her pens, while 
offering unsolicited advice on clothing and singing style. Yi’s decision to follow Wang 
and her various friends throughout the entire process, from early triumph, to eventual 
disappointment, then to giddy fandom, allows the viewer to see beyond the surface 
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objectives of these young women into the deep despair behind all of their superficial 
swagger.  
 The core desire behind the young women vying to be Super Girls is a clear example 
of utilitarian individualism: the desire to seem like an individual because it is ‘ku’, 
because it is part of modern youth culture, not because of a deeper desire for self 
expression. Many of the girls in the film present carbon copies of each other and the pop 
idols they aspire to be, but underneath the surface the individual within them is both 
stifled by this conformity and disheartened by the lack of freedom it offers. The lure of 
fame and fortune seems so tantalizingly close that it’s understandable that millions of 
young women are clamoring to compete for it, but the realism of not being deemed 
special enough forces the utilitarian individual mindset into a corner: how to be ku when 
you have been rejected? How to be a part of this consumer culture when you don’t want 
to get a job? How do you keep from being other when the pop culture values are shifting 
constantly under your feet?  
Yi sticks with Wang’s story line perhaps because of her willingness to be so 
forthcoming with her personal background and family problems. Like many other girls 
we encoder, her parents are divorced. Her father, who has remarried and had another 
child, supports Wang by renting an apartment for her and paying all her living expenses. 
We see him calling later in the film to make sure she was able to afford a new outfit for 
her audition and that she has enough money (several hundred Yuan) for the week. Her 
mother, however, is not doing as well, Wang attributes this difficulty to several factors: 
“she’s a woman, after all. Plus, she’s honest, and she isn’t particularly assertive.” The 
emotional pain caused by her parents’ separation is clear early on, but what is less clear is 
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the reason behind her attitude towards each now. She seemingly resents her father for his 
abandoning her, but at the same time admires him for his business skills and readily 
accepts all the money he offers. Her feelings towards her mother are closest to pity: a 
woman who is unable to be business savvy enough to earn her own money. When she 
describes how her father might not approve of her choice of job or her entering the 
contest, she asserts that she is the master of her own voice, then going back to browsing 
through jeans that her father will ultimately end up paying for. If money and material 
items are everything, it would be almost impossible for Wang to stand up to her sole 
provider and still maintain her excessive standard of living.  
Wang also exhibits her insecurities and contradictions through her clothing 
choices. The first Super Girl Contest winner was Li Yuchun, who received over 3.5 
million cell phone votes to claim the title and became an overnight sensation. Li Yuchun 
stood out from the other contestants mainly because of her androgynous style and low 
alto singing voice, and when she won this style became just as popular as her hit singles, 
just as quickly. Half of the contestants we see are still sporting the hyper-feminine pink 
dresses and high heels that were considered more fashionable in previous years, but 
there’s a strong contingency of these new tomboyish girls who have clearly modeled 
themselves after Li Yuchun based on her success. Jian Yi, when interviewed by NPR, 
suggested that one reason for the cropped hair, baggy jeans and big shirts is that most of 
the call-in voters on the show are girls, and looking like a cute boy in this all-female 
competition can make a performer more appealing. 77  Wang and her friend, Lucy, 
reinforce this analysis when discussing a fellow contestant, Fu Jing: Lucy takes a photo 
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with her and says “I’ll keep this in my phone and tell people she’s my boyfriend!”   
Whatever the cause behind the phenomenon, Wang’s strict adherence to this 
trendy new style shows how insecure she is. The blindly following of trends is part of the 
consumer culture, but it offers no comfort, as Wang finds out. In one scene, she describes 
how she prefers to wear her clothes baggy and her sunglasses large to obscure her face 
and body, so her ‘ugliness’ is hidden from view. She also goes up to other contestants and 
critiques their style if it’s the feminine dresses that she has rejected, saying that if you get 
too dressed up the judges will think you’re trying to hard. The line she’s trying to draw is 
that this style is out and hers is in, hoping to cement her place in the ‘ku’ crowd. By the 
end of the film, Wang has been eliminated from the competition and her friend Fu Jing, 
who also has a masculine style, has made it to the top ten. Wang, now a member of Fu 
Jing’s fan club, takes a photo with her when they’re wearing the same outfit and Fu 
remarks that she’ll have to change before she goes on camera: Wang is no longer in style 
and therefore she’s out altogether. The ‘ku’ ideal has changed and she has been left 
behind entirely.  
 Wang, as well as the other 1266 contestants to make it to the second round of 
auditions are all drawn in by the promise of the show: if you’re ‘ku’ enough and in the 
correct way, the world is yours. Enough people considered Li Yuchun ku, and even 
though she’s popular as a pop star and entertainer, she’s also admired because her fame 
brings her material wealth. In China, pop offers the promise of unlimited glamour and 
glory and this is the narrative all of these young women are buying into. However, if this 
lifestyle is all you seek and where you place your values, there will ultimately be the 
crushing realization that the rich and well connected have an unfair advantage. A friend 
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of Wang’s, Momo, another tomboy devotee, reacts poorly to being eliminated from the 
second round and accuses the contest of being rigged for those with connections. As she 
speeds away in her Mercedes SUV, she vows that she’ll use her own connections through 
her wealthy family to find a spot in the top ten. The irony of fighting nepotism with more 
nepotism is lost on Momo but picked up by Wang, who, when she’s eliminated the next 
day sobs that the whole show is just a game. This realization is maybe her most astute 
observation in the film. Utilitarian individualism brings no real fulfillment and this is the 
reality that many modern Chinese youths are finding.  
 In the midst of all these girls trying to out-trend the other, is a lone relic from a not-
so-distant past. As Wang awaits her audition for the second round, she scoffs at a country 
girl dressed in a Red Guard outfit, asking, “Is she going to sing a Cultural Revolution 
song?” Yi then turns to interview the girl, who identifies herself as from the countryside 
and is aware of her outsider status; she’s used to it. City people don’t treat the country 
people as equals, she says, “they treat us like dirt”. What she takes as simple classism 
might be the surface reaction to a much deeper wound. In this rich, urban, Westernized 
culture, she represents the intrusion of an alternate China supposedly long buried, but 
lurking just beyond the frame.  
 The Red Guard Super Girl also serves as a reminder of a past that the other Super 
Girls, and China as a whole, has not yet entirely left behind. Director Yi explains, “There 
was a search for identity after the Cultural Revolution because there was no tradition left 
anymore and we weren’t very different from the Americans or others around the world. 
This is a very confusing time in our history, there’s a split personality for all of us.”78 The 
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traditional culture that had defined China up until the Communist Revolution was 
supposedly delivered a fatal blow by the anesthetizing period of the Cultural Revolution, 
but a five thousand year old culture is not so easily removed from the cultural psyche. So, 
even as these girls strive to be modern and western, aspects of their Chinese cultural roots 
show through. One hopeful contestant explains, “you only have three chances to change 
your destiny, to make a difference in your life.” Others, including the Red Guard girl 
speak of the show as a way of changing their destiny or “be the master of my own 
destiny.” The cultural tendency towards collectivism can also been seen in the propensity 
to form ardent fan clubs around your favorite singer, often taking to the street to gather 
votes for them. Although it might be hard to see it behind all the stylized clothes, the 
traditional values of China still inform the worldviews of these young women.  
What comes through most clearly in Super, Girls! is its portrait of a very old 
culture rushing headlong into the hyper-capitalist future, in which business values trump 
all others, individualism clashes with traditional ideals of collectivism and community, 
and self-promotion negates Confucian humility, and finding there to be uncomfortable 
growing pains in this enforced transition.  When the national finalists gather onstage to 
sing the show’s theme song, I’m empowered by joy. I shine like no other. Every caring 
eye sees my growth, we see that this might be true for those who have made it to the 
stage, but for those who were left behind, this dream is still out of reach.79 The final 
image we’re left with is of two young girls watching these Super Girls on the monitors; 
they will inherit these social aspirations and will likely be just as disappointed by them.  
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A Global Movement in Follow Your Heart 
 
 The 2007 documentary directed by Engish-Chinese Duncan Jepson, chronicles the 
underground hip hop culture through a series of interviews with industry professionals 
and profiles of five rising stars in the Shanghai scene. The film’s central action revolves 
around the first hip hop party in the small city of Guiyang in Guizhou which would bring 
these various players from the hip hop scene together in a exhibition style party. The 
main characters all represent different aspects of the burgeoning hip hop scene in China: 
Gary Wang, a DJ, Sic Cheung, a graffiti artist, Wang Bo, a freestyle rapper, Stanly Wang, 
a breakdancer, and Momo, a fashion designer/model. The film, although revolving 
around the Guiyang exhibition mainly focuses on interviews about Chinese culture, hip-
hop, consumerism, and American influence. Jepson also supplements the interviews with 
statistics about the youth culture in China in comparison with adult values.  
 Jepson’s outside position, allows him to evaluate the cultural clash and 
combinations that are occurring in Shanghai, including the increasing popularity of hip-
hop. The point of view he comes from, one of both a western and Chinese background, 
allow him an insight into not only the art forms roots but also how it has been 
transformed by the Chinese values. His connections also let us see the story from both 
sides of the consumer coin: from the producers of the goods and content that the Chinese 
youth crave, and the Chinese youth themselves, responding to the attempts by these 
global brands to market to them. Jepson offers something that no other documentary has 
been able to offer: interviews with the Vice President of Marketing for PepsiCo in China, 
or of Dior Couture in Asia. Motorola, Universal records, all of these name brand directors 
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use the statistics they’ve gathered to make sweeping generalizations about the Chinese 
consumer: they’re self-infatuated, they’re optimistic, they’re status obsessed, they hate 
their parents. All of these assumptions are indeed based on figures that Jepson shows in 
the first section of the film, and while they hold true for many urban youth in China, the 
rest of the film chronicles the section of the youth market that is reacting against this 
image obsessed consumer that has been created. 
 The young Chinese featured in this film form a stark contrast to the girls featured in 
Super, Girls!. Their goals and dreams are different and their satisfaction much more real 
and accessible. Theirs is an expressive individualism, one that is born out of a true desire 
to realize something hidden and unique about themselves. As the graffiti artist Cheung 
puts it, “graffiti is not a hobby for me, it a passion hidden deep inside me and this is the 
best way to let it out”. The five lead characters reject the desire for money and material 
possessions that many of their peers find to be of the most importance. They all speak 
about how hip-hop either saved them from a life of mediocrity and dissatisfaction or how 
it allowed them to channel their frustrations into an art form that was rewarding. These 
five descend on Guiyang ready to sell the gospel of hip-hop, but only if it is received for 
the proper reasons.  
 These youths all seem very aware and also wary of the growing pop consumer 
culture that they find springing up around them. One DJ who is studying under Gary 
Wang describes how his friends view the world: “I want to learn, my peers just want to 
make money, which I think is very short sighted. My views are in the minority, however. 
People just don’t want to be challenged anymore, doing your own thing makes you an 
outsider.” The style of this film, which focuses on interviews much more heavily than 
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any of the previous five films studied, is conducive to this sort of studied response about 
the world around them. Most of the other five artists mirror this sentiment in their own 
statements, casting off statements like “money is importance, but you shouldn’t forget 
your ideals” and “a lot of people now are buying into this culture without having an idea 
what it means.” As stated in the first section this chapter, the expressive individualism is 
often formed in response and contrast to the utilitarian individualism that forms the norm 
for society. These young adults are able to distinguish themselves mainly through the lens 
of being “other”, of rejecting the cultural standard in favor of something that departs from 
it not only stylistically but also in values.  
 The difference between their motivations and the motivations of the Super Girls is 
the obvious joy these hip-hop artists take in performing and in spreading the word. These 
are not merely disaffected kids looking for an outlet at any cost; they are true believers in 
the necessity to find your passion and the ability of every individual to be creative and 
unique. After the show in Guiyang, which plays out like more of a pilgrimage than a hip-
hop performance, Gary expresses that he isn’t so much concerned if the show was a huge 
success with the majority of people, they’re just hoping to change the life of at least one 
person. The people who’s life they might have changed are shown in a cut back to the 
night before, where two young boys, no older than 15, are giddily proclaiming their love 
for hip-hop and their newfound desire to make it in the world of hip-hop like the artists 
they just saw. In an earlier scene, a high school student from Urumqi, the capital of the 
far Western Xinjiang province, describes how he took a 48-hour train to Shanghai just to 
spend his spring vacation studying with Gary. This is the market the hip-hop devotees 
have been trying to reach, and it’s through their passion that the message has been spread. 
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 The mainstream appeal of hip-hop seems to be removed from this world, as well, 
and it has become a uniquely Chinese expression through its adoption by this group. The 
designer Momo speaks disparagingly about those who dress in hip-hop style but don’t 
understand the deeper meaning behind the music or have anything to do with the hip-hop 
culture in China that this movement has created. For youths to damage the image of hip-
hop in China by not understanding it is the biggest insult because this movement is not 
the carbon copy of American culture, which mainstream youth might idolize. Instead, this 
movement, as Gary explains, takes the style of hip-hop and the message behind it, and 
applies it to a Chinese worldview. The issues they rap about are Chinese, the dances are 
informed by a Chinese tradition as well as a western one, the graffiti takes an American 
style and uses it to express Chinese art and beauty. Unlike many other forms of pop 
culture today, the point of this movement is not how Western it is, but how it expresses a 
Chinese worldview through a Western medium. The distinction is key, not only for the 
individual expressiveness of it, but also for the future of Chinese art.  
 If China wishes to become a global force of soft power, or to just make their mark 
on the modern global culture, they’ll need to focus on what is uniquely theirs, instead of 
copying and rehashing what is seen as uniquely American or western. The Super Girls 
are guilty of this because of the lack of individual expression they put into the western art 
form, the hip-hop artists in Follow Your Heart have moved towards creating something 
uniquely Chinese that can also appeal to those across cultural lines. A similarity these 
artists share with the Super Girls, however, is also uniquely Chinese. Although these two 
groups have approached pop culture from very different standpoints, they are both 
seeking to transform their destinies.  
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Conclusion 
 
As seen above, the youth culture in China is not homogenous and is marked by 
many inconsistences and rapid changes. Such complexities of Chinese urban youth 
identity reflect the material and cultural conditions of China’s dual modernity under 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”, with its inherent contradictions and hybridity. 
Youth have to form their modern identities at the intersection of tradition and 
globalization, and development and consumerism.  
There is, of course, no ‘right’ way to be a modern youth or to experience youth 
culture, and young adults around the world are having their dreams disappointed, it could 
be argued that this is a natural part of the aging process. However, there is a dangerous 
trend in China, as evidenced by the statistics in the second section of this chapter, 
towards a consumerism that isn’t being outgrown and is instead becoming the chief goal 
of many young people. As seen in the films, this type of infatuation with the consumer 
culture often leads to young adults feeling adrift if they are unable to attain it, often even 
if they are unable to attain it, the lack of satisfaction it provides can be deeply 
disheartening. The only remedy is to seek real fulfillment not through what the culture 
dictates but through personal expression.  
As China becomes more and more present on the global stage, the youth 
population will find that their culture becomes more and more of a force not only in East 
Asia but also globally. Their ability to shape global culture will one day surpass their 
ability to be shaped by it, but if their entire youth culture is a copy of Western culture, 
there is no longer any power in it. China has the longest history of any modern society to 
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draw upon for cultural inspiration but their frantic abandonment of this culture in the 20th 
century has led to a void that has yet to be filled by anything more permanent than a 
consumer obsessed society. This culture has not been lost however, and if the youth of 
today are willing to draw upon it when creating the new cultural expressions of today, all 
of China will be stronger because of it.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 As shown in the chapters above, Chinese documentary film provides the most 
informative and personal outlet into the lives of the youth in China today and the 
challenges they are facing. In the past four chapters, I have shown how the effects of 
sweeping government and societal changes have deeply altered the course of the lives of 
many young men and women in China, but that it has not necessarily altered their 
worldview. The young men and boys, particularly those focused on in Up The Yangtze 
and Please Vote For Me, would likely still view the world with a certain amount of 
privilege and rely on their personal connections to help them achieve their goals. The 
children of the migrant workers seen in Railroad of Hope and Last Train Home, would 
likely still face their parents’ expectations for improvement of their social situation even 
if they were able to work closer to home. And all young men and women would still be 
facing the clash of the promise of prestige with the reality of  
 So if the historical circumstances haven’t fundamentally changed the psyche of the 
youth in China today, why both to examine it through film? Because the political and 
social movements have still shaped their lives in terms of economic opportunities, 
personal freedoms, and social motivations, and if they are understood in combination 
with the deeply rooted cultural values that direct the actions and mindset of the youth, 
then the future leaders of China will be better understood. Those ruling China today were 
born before the PRC was even a fully established country. Hu Jintao, the paramount 
leader of China for the past ten years, would have lives his formative years under civil 
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war, then the Communist Revolution, then the Great Leap Forward and other campaigns. 
He would’ve been in his twenties during the Cultural Revolution, so the youths who were 
involved in that campaign haven’t yet reached the highest offices in government. It will 
be several decades before the youth of today are in control of the decisions of the CCP 
and much can change between now and then, but what won’t change are the experiences 
in their youth that will shape their view of themselves, China, and its place in the world.  
 The documentary features that are coming out of China today are not only a way to 
reveal the struggles of those living at the margin or to chronicle a particular event, but 
show the reality of everyday life for millions of people, that up until very recently, 
remained a mystery. The films selected were chosen because of the combination of issue 
they portray and style in which they portray it that allows the viewer to experience the 
most unaltered moments and get at the deepest realities. Since the advent of digital 
filmmaking, the directors need nothing more than a handheld camera to begin shooting 
and therefore are able to plant themselves firmly among those they are filming without 
appearing too obtrusive. The result is a more intimate and also more real portrait of 
modern China than almost any other medium can provide. The stories we hear are being 
told to us directly, yes, but more importantly they’re playing out before our eyes, without 
needing to be said. This combination of word and image is what makes all movies 
powerful; the reality of it is what makes documentary powerful.  
 As someone who belongs to the generation that is being studied here, the 
implications about the youth in China resonate deeply with me not only because of my 
own interests in Chinese culture and language but because of the likely importance the 
relationship between the Chinese and Americans of this generation. As China and the 
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United States begin to emerge more and more as two of the dominant global powers in 
the 21st century, the level of understanding and sympathy between the two populations 
seems to be stagnant. The only way for the West to truly understand the path China has 
taken and the course it is likely now to start is by studying its history and these modern 
social issues, yes, but also by listening to the voices of those within China. During my 
time there in 2010, I was astonished not only by what I heard and saw but also by how 
little I had known or expected to see. The view of many in my generation, even the future 
leaders of it, is not much more broad and it will need to be. Beyond making trips to China 
and actually interacting, I have found that documentary film has been the most 
illuminating source of not only information but also understanding, that is available.  
 As I finish this thesis, it has become clear that the more I try to understand every 
intricacy of Chinese modern life, the harder it becomes. China is constantly changing and 
to correctly gauge the path it’s headed on would be impossible. The best way to face this 
challenge is to have a firm grip of the history and culture, and how that history plays out 
in the modern era is best seen through documentary film.   
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